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We revisit the crucial issue of natural game equivalences, and semantics of game logics based on
these. We present reasons for investigating finer concepts of game equivalence than equality of
standard powers, though staying short of modal bisimulation. Concretely, we propose a more fine-
grained notion of equality of ‘basic powers’ which record what players can force plus what they leave
to others to do, a crucial feature of interaction. This notion is closer to game-theoretic strategic form,
as we explain in detail, while remaining amenable to logical analysis. We determine the properties
of basic powers via a new representation theorem, find a matching ‘instantial neighborhood game
logic’, and show how our analysis can be extended to a new game algebra and dynamic game logic.
1 Introduction
Games are a basic model for interactive agency, but how much structure do we want to consider? Game
theory offers strategic form games and extensive games, which represent two levels of structure, less
or more detailed. Logic of games has also looked at other natural invariances between representations
of games, such as equivalence of powers for players. As in other areas of mathematics, the search for
natural invariances continues, and in this paper we offer a new notion bridging between game theory and
logic: strong power equivalence, that uses powers encoding a sort of qualitative equilibria. We determine
its properties in a new representation theorem for the “basic powers” in a game, show that it has a natural
associated logic, and that it supports an interesting new game algebra where the methodological principle
of compositionality eventually forces us to change from functional to relational strategies. Besides the
representation theorem for basic powers, the main technical contribution of the paper is a completeness
theorem for the new game logic that we define. The proof uses a technique developed in [3], but requires
a non-trivial adaptation due to the presence of extra frame constraints.
We believe that our proposed game equivalence is new, but even so, it fits with a body of earlier
work. Our approach is partly inspired by the extensive computational literature on process equivalences,
ranging from coarser trace equivalence to more fine-grained notions of bisimulation [10]. Even more
central in our approach was the by now standard notion of power equivalence, implicit in the game al-
gebra of Parikh [13], which also links with the set- theoretic forms for games presented in [4]. Another
obvious precursor inside game theory is the celebrated transformation analysis of equivalent games with
imperfect information by Thompson [14] (refined by Elmes and Reny in [6]), which is close to power
equivalence. But game theory also has comparative discussions of the information available in exten-
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sive forms and in strategic normal forms [7], a style of analysis that remains to be connected to our
representation theorems and logics for different levels of describing games.
Finally, it should be said that further intuitions of game equivalence emerge once we consider players’
preferences, so that game equivalence can also refer to correlations between available equilibria. This
further level is beyond the scope of this paper, but it would be a natural next step to take.
2 Powers
2.1 Powers and power equivalence
We begin by reviewing a standard logical notion of game equivalence in terms of powers of the players.
For a standard overview of the basic concepts of game theory, see [12]. For more on equivalence of
extensive games, see [4, 6, 14].
Definition 1. A tree T is a prefix closed subset of N∗, subject to the condition that if w · j ∈T and i< j
then w · i ∈ T as well. The empty word ε is the root of the tree.
Definition 2. An extensive game G for a finite set of players A with outcomes in the set O is a tuple
(T , t,o,Π) where T is a finite tree, t a map from T to A, o a map from branches of T to O, and Π a
partition of T subject to the following condition: for any pair w,v within the same partition cell of Π, w
and v have the same number of children in T , and furthermore t(n) = t(n′). If all partition cells of Π are
singletons we call G a game of perfect information, and we omit Π.
Maximal branches of T will also be called full matches, and prefixes of maximal branches are called
partial matches.
A strategy for player a ∈ A is a map σ : t−1[a]→ N where w ·σ(w) is a child of w for each w with
t(w) = a, and σ(w) = σ(w′) whenever w,w′ are in the same partition cell in Π. A strategy profile is
a tuple (σa)a∈A of one strategy for each player in A. A strategy profile p completely determines a full
match, and hence a leaf of the game tree, so we can speak of the outcome of p, denoting it by o(p).
Generally, we say that a full match m of G is guided by the strategy σ for a if for every prefix w of m
such that t(w) = a, σ(w) is also a prefix of m. Match(σ) is the set of σ -guided matches.
We denote the set of games for players A with outcomes in O as G(A,O). For two-player games we
call the players by A (Alice) and B (Bob). We set A= B and B= A.
Note that we have not attributed payoffs to matches in a game or preferences over the outcomes, but
rather (and more generally) simply outcomes from some fixed chosen set. In this sense we are dealing
with game forms rather than proper games. We return to the issue of preferences in Section 7.1.
Definition 3. Let G = (T , t,o,Π) be a game with outcomes in O. A set P ⊆ O is a power of player
a ∈ A in the game G if there is a strategy σ for a in G such that o(m) ∈ P for every σ -guided match m.
Given a player a ∈ A we let Pa(G ) denote the set of powers of a in G .
Two games G1,G2 ∈G(A,O) are power equivalent if for all a ∈ A: Pa(G1) = Pa(G2). We denote this
by G1 ∼ G2. If Pa(G1) = Pa(G2) for some specific a ∈ A, we write G1 ∼a G2.
Every game G in G(A,O) gives rise to a tuple (Pa(G ))a∈A of subsets of O, which represents a crucial
aspect of social scenarios: the abilities of participants to force outcomes.
Powers in two-player games, our focus in what follows, are characterized by three formal properties,
for a set of outcomes O, and a pair FA,FB of families of subsets of O:
Non-emptiness For all u ∈W there are Z,Z′ ⊆W such that (u,Z) ∈ FA and (u,Z
′) ∈ FB.
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Monotonicity If P ∈ FA (P ∈ FB) and P⊆Q⊆ O, then Q ∈ FA (Q ∈ FB).
Consistency If P ∈ FA and Q ∈ FB, then P∩Q 6= /0.
Theorem 1. The families FA,FB⊆P(O) satisfy the Non-emptiness, Monotonicity and Consistency prop-
erties if, and only if, there exists a game G ∈G({A,B},O) such that FA = PA(G ) and FB = PB(G ).
A representation theorem also holds for perfect information games, with this additional property:
Determinacy For all sets P⊆O, either P ∈ FA or
O\P ∈ FB.
Theorem 2. The families FA,FB ⊆ P(O) satisfy the Non-emptiness, Monotonicity, Consistency and
Determinacy properties if, and only if, there exists a perfect information game G ∈ G({A,B},O) such
that FA = PA(G ) and FB = PB(G ).
For proofs of these results we refer to [2].
2.2 Neighborhood logic and bisimilarity
The use of neighborhood semantics to interpret a propositional dynamic logic of powers in determined
games dates back to [13]. Here, we review a modal logic GL for powers in two-player games from [2],
which drops the game constructions (for these, see Section 6) as well as determinacy, referring explicitly
to powers of separate players in the syntax.
Given a set of propositional variables Prop, the syntax of GL is given by the following grammar:
ϕ := p ∈ Prop | ϕ ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ | [A]ϕ | [B]ϕ
The semantics for this logic uses neighborhood models that assign each player a neighborhood rela-
tion representing the powers of that player relative to each world. Of course, we must impose suitable
constraints to ensure that these actually behave as powers of players in some game. The representation
result Theorem 1 tells us what these should be:
Definition 4. A game frame is a triple (W,RA,RB) such thatW is a set and RP⊆W ×PW for each player
P ∈ {A,B}, and such that for all u ∈W the pair RA[u],RB[u] satisfies the Non-emptiness, Monotonicity
and Consistency conditions (withW viewed as the set of outcomes O, so that RA[u],RB[u] make up two
families of sets of outcomes). A game model is a game frame together with a valuation V : Prop→PW .
We define the interpretations of all formulas in a game model M= (W,RA,RB,V ) as follows:
(a) [[p]] =V (p), (b) [[ϕ ∧ψ ]] = [[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]], (c) [[¬ϕ ]] =W \ [[ϕ ]],
and crucially, for the modality: (d) [[[P]ϕ ]] = R−1
P
[[[ϕ ]]]. Note that the Monotonicity condition makes
this equivalent to: u ∈ [[[P]ϕ ]] iff there exists Z ⊆ [[ϕ ]] with uRPZ.
We write M,v  ϕ for v ∈ [[ϕ ]], and  ϕ (‘ϕ is valid’) if, for every game model M and v ∈W , we
have M,v  ϕ .
Game models come with a natural notion of bisimulation:
Definition 5. LetM= (W,R,V ),M′ = (W ′,R′,V ′) be game models. The relation B⊆W ×W ′ is said to
be a power bisimulation if, for all uBu′ and each P ∈ {A,B}, we have:
Forth For all Z such that uRPZ, there exists a Z
′ such that u′(R′
P
)Z′ and the following condition holds:
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Forth-Back For all v′ ∈ Z′ there is some v ∈ Z such that vBv′.
Back For all Z′ such that u′RPZ
′ there is some Z such that uRPZ and the following condition holds:
Back-Forth For all v ∈ Z there is some v′ ∈ Z′ such that vBv′.
We say that pointed game models M,w and N,v are power bisimilar, written M,w←→N,v, if there is
a power bisimulation B between M and N such that wBv.
All formulas of GL are invariant for power bisimilarity:
Proposition 1. IfM,w←→N,v then M,w  ϕ iff N,v ϕ , for each formula ϕ of GL.
The logic GL can be axiomatized by a simple extension of monotone (multi-)modal logic. Here is a
version using axiom schemata and a rule of replacement of equivalents:
Axioms for GL
Non-Em [P]⊤
Mon [P]ϕ → [P](ϕ ∨ψ)
Cons [P]ϕ →¬[P]¬ϕ
Proof rules
MP
ϕ → ψ ϕ
ψ
RE
ϕ ↔ ψ θ
θ [ϕ/ψ ]
where θ [ϕ/ψ ] is the result of substituting some
occurrences of the formula ψ by ϕ in θ .
We denote this system of axioms by GL and write GL ⊢ ϕ to say that the formula ϕ is provable in this
axiom system.
Theorem 3. The logic GL is sound and complete for validity on game frames.
The completeness proof is an exercise involving a straightforward canonical model construction,
which we omit. Furthermore, GL is decidable and has the finite model property.
3 Rethinking powers and game equivalence
3.1 From powers to strategic equivalence
Power equivalence, while a natural and simple notion of game equivalence, is relatively coarse. In
particular, it misses much of the interactive nature of games. To illustrate what we mean by this, here is
an example from [2].
Consider the two games depicted in Figure 1. In both games, each player can perform two actions
“left” and “right”, and there are three possible outcomes 1,2,3. If Alice moves left, then the outcome is
1 regardless of the action chosen by Bob, but if Alice moves right, the outcome depends on the actions
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of Bob: if Bob moves left, the outcome is 2, otherwise 3. The difference lies in which player moves first.
In the figure, the game where Alice chooses first is depicted to the left, and the game where Bob chooses
first to the right.
2 3
1 B
l
✼✼✼✼ r
✞✞✞✞
A
l
❅❅❅❅❅ r
②②②②②②
1 2 1 3
A
l
✼✼✼✼ r
✞✞✞✞
A
l
✼✼✼✼ r
✞✞✞✞
B
l
❊❊❊❊❊❊ r
②②②②②②
Figure 1: Two power equivalent games.
It is easy to see that each player has the same powers in both games, and this is the basis for standard
game logics (the games represent two sides of a standard propositional distribution law). But the inter-
action of the players looks different: in the right game, A has an obvious strategy for which the possible
outcomes are precisely 1 and 2. But in the left game, the only way that A can exclude the outcome 3 is
to go left at the start of the game, making 1 the only possible outcome. Thus, it is doubtful if one should
see these games as equivalent.
Another way of phrasing the difference is this. The two games differ if we think of powers more
‘socially’ as what a player is going to force while at the same time recording which choices are left
intentionally to the other player. That is, both players have a say, and the notion of power becomes
oriented toward both players, more in the spirit of game-theoretic equilibrium. This intuition can be
made a bit more precise if we bring in a standard game-theoretic device. Let us display the strategic
forms of the two games, with rows corresponding to strategies for A and columns strategies of B:
1 1
2 3
1 1
2 1
1 3
2 3
Looking at the yields of columns and rows, the above difference is clear. Here is a finer notion of
game equivalence, inspired by the ‘matrix logic’ of [1]:
Definition 6. Let G1 and G2 be two-player games over the set of outcomes O. A strategy profile bisim-
ulation between these two games is a relation R ⊆ P1×P2, where P1 is the set of strategy profiles of G1
and P2 is the set of strategy profiles of G2, such that if (σ1,τ1)R(σ2,τ2), then:
Atomic o1(σ1,τ1) = o2(σ2,τ2),
Forth(A) For all strategies σ ′1 for A in G1 there is some strategy σ
′
2 in G2 with (σ
′
1,τ1)R(σ
′
2,τ2),
Back(A) For all strategies σ ′2 for A in G2 there is some strategy σ
′
1 in G1 with (σ
′
1,τ1)R(σ
′
2,τ2)
Forth(B) For all strategies τ ′1 for B in G1 there is some strategy τ
′
2 in G2 with (σ1,τ
′
1)R(σ2,τ
′
2),
Back(B) For all strategies τ ′2 for B in G2 there is some strategy τ
′
1 in G1 with (σ1,τ
′
1)R(σ2,τ
′
2)
We call G1 and G2 are strategic form equivalent if there is a strategy profile bisimulation R between them,
relating every profile in P1 to some profile in P2, and vice versa.
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This equivalence concept is more fine-grained than power equivalence. In particular, the power
equivalent games displayed in Figure 1 are not strategic form equivalent, as can be seen by inspecting
their matrix forms. However, this approach sacrifices much of the logical simplicity of power equiva-
lence. We therefore proceed to modify the notion of power itself in line with the above strategic form
perspective.
3.2 Basic powers and strong equivalence
Our proposed new game equivalence works as follows.
Definition 7. Let G be any game in G(A,O), let a ∈ A. A power P⊆ O is said to be a basic power for a
in G if there is a strategy σ for a in G such that P= {o(m) |m ∈Match(σ)}. The set of all basic powers
of a in G is denoted by Ba(G ).
Definition 8. Two games G1 and G2 are strongly power equivalent, written G1 ≃ G2, iff Ba(G1) = Ba(G2)
for all a ∈ A. We write G1 ≃a G2 to say that Ba(G1) = Ba(G2).
Strong power equivalence is more fine-grained than power equivalence: the two games in Figure 1
are not strongly power equivalent. It also retains a connection to strategic forms.
Proposition 2. Any two strategic form equivalent games are strongly power equivalent, and any two
strongly power equivalent games are power equivalent.
All inclusions are strict here. Here are two games that are strongly power equivalent but not strategic
form equivalent – displayed in strategic form with outcome set {0,1}:
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
In the matrix on the right, the profile in the middle upper square is not bisimilar with any profile on
the left.
As a prelude to our later logical analysis, we generalize strong power equivalence to games with
different outcomes. Given G1 ∈ G(A,O1) and G2 ∈ G(A,O2), R ⊆ O1×O2 is a strategy bisimulation
between G1 and G2 if, for all a ∈ A:
Forth For all Z1 ∈ Ba(G1), there exists Z2 ∈ Ba(G2) such that Z1R˜Z2,
Back For all Z2 ∈ Ba(G2), there exists Z1 ∈ Ba(G1) such that Z1R˜Z2,
where R˜ is the Egli-Milner lifting of R. I.e., ZR˜Z′ if, for all x ∈ Z, there is x′ ∈ Z′ with xRx′, and vice
versa. It is clear that strong power equivalence is a special case of this.
Having proposed our new notion of game equivalence, we now determine its basic properties. This is
the content of the following representation theorem for basic powers. Obviously, the earlier monotonicity
condition has to be dropped, since it typically fails on our new reading of powers as also offering choices
to the other player. On the other hand, this role for the other player also validates a new condition that
did not hold before. Consider any pair FA,FB ⊆P(O):
Instantiatedness Given P ∈ FA (P ∈ FB): for any x ∈ P, there is some P
′ ∈ FB (P
′ ∈ FA) with x ∈ P
′.
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Theorem 4. Suppose FA,FB ⊆ P(O). Then the pair (FA,FB) satisfies the Non-emptiness, Instantiat-
edness and Consistency conditions if, and only if, there exists a game G such that FA = BA(G ) and
FB = BB(G ).
We can give a more compact statement of these conditions in terms of the above Egli-Milner lifting.
Then the Instantiatedness and Consistency conditions together become: for all P ∈ FA, we have P∈˜FB,
and for all P ∈ FB, we have P∈˜FA.
In order to prove the theorem, it will be convenient to work with games in strategic form:
Definition 9. A strategic form two-player gamewith outcomes inO is a tuple (ΣA,ΣB,o) such that ΣA and
ΣB are non-empty sets (interpreted as strategy sets for each player) and o : ΣA×ΣB → O is the outcome
map. An element of ΣA×ΣB is called a strategy profile.
We can define powers and instantiated powers for strategic form games in the expected manner. In
particular an instantiated power for Player A is a subset P of O such that, for some strategy σ ∈ ΣA:
P= {u ∈O | o(σ ,σ ′) = u for some σ ′ ∈ ΣB}
and dually for B. Since every extensive game has a strategic normal form, and conversely every strategic
form game is the strategic normal form of some extensive game of imperfect information, we can work
with strategic and extensive games interchangeably (see for example [12]).
It is straightforward to check that the conditions Non-emptiness, Consistency and Instantiatedness
hold for the instantiated powers of any game. For the converse, let FA,FB ⊆P(O) be given, and suppose
all three conditions hold for the pair (FA,FB). We shall construct a game G such that the instantiated
powers of each player P in G coincides with the set FP. We construct G as a strategic form game, as
follows:
• The set ΣB of strategies for B is just the set FB×O×{0,1}.
• The set ΣA of strategies for A is defined as the collection of all maps c : ΣB → O such that:
– c(Z,u, j) ∈ Z for all Z ∈ FB, u ∈ O and j ∈ {0,1}, and
– the image c[ΣB] of the set ΣB under the map c is a member of FA.
• The outcome map o sends a strategy profile (c,(Z,u, j)) ∈ ΣA×ΣB to c(Z,u, j).
The set ΣB is non-empty by the Non-emptiness condition, and it will follow from Claim 1 below that ΣA
is also non-empty. The appearance of the set O×{0,1} in this construction is merely a way to create
“enough copies” of each set in FB to make sure that certain suitable strategies for A can be defined. In
particular, it allows us to establish the following claim:
Claim 1. For every set Z ∈ FA, there exists a strategy c for A in G such that c[FB×O×{0,1}] = Z.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose Z ∈ FA. For every u ∈ Z, there exists some Z
′ ∈ FB with u ∈ Z
′, by the
Instantiatedness property. So we can define a choice function g : Z → FB such that for each u ∈ Z we
have u ∈ g(u). We can modify this g to obtain a map
g′ : Z→ FB×O×{0,1}
by mapping u ∈ Z to the triple (g(u),u,0). We can now define the strategy c as follows: given a triple
(g(u),u,0) in the image of Z under the map g′, we set c(g(u),u,0) = u. For every triple (Z′,u′,k) not in
the image of g′, we set c(Z′,u′,k) to be some arbitrary element of Z∩Z′, which exists by the Consistency
condition. Clearly we get that the image of the set FB×O×{0,1} under the map c is equal to Z.
Furthermore, since c(Z′,u′,k) ∈ Z′ for each triple (Z′,u′,k), we get that c is a legitimate strategy for A in
G .
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A second claim that we will need is the following:
Claim 2. Let Z ∈ FB, u ∈ Z, u
′ ∈ O and let j ∈ {0,1}. Then there exists a strategy c for A in G such that
c(Z,u′, j) = u.
Proof of Claim 2. By the Instantiatedness property there exists some Z′ ∈ FA such that u ∈ Z
′. But by
Claim 1 there exists some c which is a legitimate move for A in G , such that c[FB×O×{0,1}] = Z
′. In
fact, by inspection of the proof of Claim 1, we see that we may pick c so that c[FB×O×{0}] = Z
′ as
well. Now define the map c′ as follows: if j = 0 then define c′ to be like c except that c′(Z,u′,0) = u
and c′(Z,u′,1) = c(Z,u′,0). If j = 1, then define c′ to be like c except that c′(Z,u′,1) = u. In either
case, we still have c′[FB×O×{0,1}] = Z
′, and so we see that c′ is a legitimate strategy for A. Since
c′(Z,u′, j) = u, we are done.
We now show that every instantiated power for either player P is an element of FP, and vice versa.
We have four different inclusions to prove, two for each player.
Suppose that Z ∈ FA. By Claim 1 there exists a strategy c for A such that c[FB×O×{0,1}] = Z. But
since the possible strategies for B are exactly the members of the set FB×O×{0,1}, it follows that Z is
an instantiated power for A.
Conversely, suppose that Z is an instantiated power for A in G . Then there exists a strategy c for
A such that the possible outcomes consistent with c are precisely the members of Z. It follows that
c[F2×O×{0,1}] = Z. But since the strategies for A are subject to the constraint that c[F2×O×{0,1}] ∈
FA, it follows that we must have Z ∈ FA.
To prove the inclusions for B we need the following claim:
Claim 3. Let (Z,u,k) ∈ FB×O×{0,1}, considered as a strategy for B. Then the possible outcomes
consistent with this strategy are precisely the members of Z, i.e. Z = {c(Z,u,k) | c ∈ ΣA}.
Proof of Claim 3. Let Z′ denote the set of all possible outcomes consistent with the strategy (Z,u,k). It
is clear that Z′ ⊆ Z, since every possible outcome u′ consistent with the strategy (Z,u,k) is of the form
c(Z,u,k) for some strategy c ∈ FA, which means that u
′ = c(Z,u,k) ∈ Z. Conversely, if u′ ∈ Z then by
Claim 2 there exists a strategy c for A such that c(Z,u,k) = u′. So u′ is an outcome that is consistent with
the strategy (Z,u,k), hence u′ ∈ Z′. So we get Z = Z′, and the proof is finished.
We can now easily prove both of the inclusions for B: if Z ∈ FB, then (Z,u,0) is a legitimate strategy
for B for any arbitrarily chosen u ∈ O, and it now follows directly from Claim 3 that Z is an instantiated
power for B. Conversely, if Z is an instantiated power for B in G then there is some strategy (Z′,u,k) for
B witnessing this. By Claim 3 we get Z = Z′, and since (Z′,u,k) is a strategy for B we have Z′ ∈ FB. So
Z ∈ FB, and we are done.
From this proof, we can also read off the following result:
Theorem 5. Our properties of basic powers also capture the powers computed from rows and columns
of matrix games.
At present we do not have a representation theorem for basic powers in the special case of perfect
information games. It is easy to find additional conditions on powers that hold in this setting, but we
have not yet found a complete set.
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4 The logic of basic powers: instantial game logic
What is the game logic that goes with strong power equivalence? Our earlier notion of strategy bisim-
ulation points the way. It resembles the instantial neighborhood bisimulations introduced in [?] as the
invariance underlying instantial neighborhood logic. Accordingly, we now introduce a logic for games
at this level of structure. The syntax of instantial game logic IGL is given by the following grammar:
ϕ := p ∈ Prop | ϕ ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ | [A](Ψ;ϕ) | [B](Ψ;ϕ)
where Ψ ranges over finite sets of formulas of IGL. We sometimes write [P](ψ1, ...,ψn;ϕ) rather than
[P]({ψ1, ...,ψn};ϕ), [P](ψ ;ϕ) for [P]({ψ};ϕ), and [P]ϕ for [P]( /0;ϕ).
The semantics of IGL, as for GL, uses neighborhood models. However, the constraints are different,
since we are now dealing with basic powers. These constraints come from our representation result for
basic powers Theorem 4.
Definition 10. An instantial game frame (W,RA,RB) is a triple withW a set, and RP ⊆W ×PW for each
player P ∈ {A,B}, where for all u ∈W , the pair (RA[u],RB[u]) satisfies Non-emptiness, Instantiatedness
and Consistency. Instantial game models then add a valuation for propositional variables.
The key clause in the truth definition in instantiated game modelsM= (W,RA,RB,V ) runs as follows:
u ∈ [[[P](ψ1, ...,ψk;ϕ)]] iff there is some Z ⊆W such that
(u,Z) ∈ RP and Z ⊆ [[ϕ ]], Z∩ [[ψi]] 6= /0 for i ∈ {1, ...,k}.
If we interpret formulas as ‘outcomes’, then we see why IGL is a natural language for basic powers:
the formula [P](Ψ;
∨
Ψ) says that Ψ is a basic power for the player P, while the weaker formula [P]
∨
Ψ
says that Ψ is simply a power.
Instantial models come with a notion of bisimulation which stands to strong power equivalence as
standard neighborhood bisimulations stands to power equivalence:
Definition 11. Let M = (W,R,V ) and M′ = (W ′,R′,V ′) be any neighborhood models. The relation
B ⊆W ×W ′ is said to be an instantial neighborhood bisimulation if, for all uBu′ and P ∈ {A,B}, we
have:
Forth For all Z such that uRPZ, there is some Z
′ such that u′(R′
P
)Z′ and the following conditions hold:
Forth-Back For all v′ ∈ Z′ there is some v ∈ Z such that vBv′.
Forth-Forth For all v ∈ Z there is some v′ ∈ Z′ such that vBv′.
Back For all Z′ such that u′RPZ
′ there is some Z such that uRPZ and the following condition holds:
Back-Forth For all v ∈ Z there is some v′ ∈ Z′ such that vBv′.
Back-Back For all v′ ∈ Z′ there is some v ∈ Z such that vBv′.
Pointed instantial game models M,w and N,v are instantial neighborhood bisimilar, M,w←→N,v, if
some instantial neighborhood bisimulation B between M and N has wBv.
Formulas of IGL are invariant for instantial bisimilarity:
Proposition 3. IfM,w←→N,v then M,w  ϕ iff N,v ϕ , for each formula ϕ of IGL.
More can be said about the model theory of instantial neighborhood simulation, but the present facts
suffice here.
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5 Axiomatizing IGL
In this section we axiomatize the valid formulas of IGL, thus pinning down the modal logic of basic
powers. Our system is a gentle modification of instantial neighborhood logic.
IGL axioms.
Mon [P](ψ1, ...,ψn;ϕ)→ [P](ψ1∨α1, ...,ψn ∨αn;ϕ ∨β )
Weak [P](Ψ;ϕ)→ [P](Ψ′;ϕ) for Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ
Un [P](ψ1, ...,ψn;ϕ)→ [P](ψ1∧ϕ , ...,ψn∧ϕ ;ϕ)
Lem [P](Ψ;ϕ)→ [P](Ψ∪{γ};ϕ)∨ [P](Ψ;ϕ ∧¬γ)
Bot ¬[P](⊥;ϕ)
Axioms for frame constraints
Non-Em [P]⊤
Inst [P](ψ ;⊤)↔ [P](ψ ;⊤)
Cons [P]ϕ →¬[P]¬ϕ
Proof rules.
MP
ϕ → ψ ϕ
ψ
RE
ϕ ↔ ψ θ
θ [ϕ/ψ ]
We denote this system of axioms by IGL and write IGL ⊢ ϕ to say that the formula ϕ is provable in this
axiom system.
Theorem 6. The system IGL is sound and complete for validity over instantial game models.
The soundness part of this result is checked case by case, and the easy argument is omitted. The
completeness proof proceeds via a normal form argument, following an idea in [3]. The adaptation to
the present setting is not trivial however, since we have to deal with the new frame constraints of Non-
emptines, Consistency and Instantiatedness. The main contribution here is thus to prove that the model
construction satisfies these constraints. We outline the key parts of the proof below.
Definition 12. The modal depth of a formula is defined inductively by:
- d(p) = 0
- d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ)
- d(ϕ ∧ψ) = max(d(ϕ),d(ψ))
- d([P](Γ;ϕ)) = max(d[Γ∪{ϕ}])+1
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Definition 13. Given a finite set of propositional variables Q, a formula ϕ is said to be a Q-formula if all
propositional variables appearing in ϕ belong to Q.
Given k ∈ ω and a finite set Q of propositional variables, a (Q,k)-description is a consistent Q-
formula ϕ of modal depth ≤ k, such that for any Q-formula θ of depth ≤ k, we have ϕ ⊢ θ or ϕ ⊢ ¬θ .
Note that there are at most finitely many Q-formulas of depth ≤ k, given that Q is finite. We omit the
(standard) argument for this.
The key lemma for the completeness proof is the following:
Lemma 1. Let [P](Γ;ϕ) be a formula such that max(d[Γ∪{ϕ}])≤ k and let Q be a finite set of proposi-
tional variables containing all variables appearing in this formula. Then [P](Γ;ϕ) is provably equivalent
to some disjunction of the form: ∨
i∈I
[P](Θi;
∨
Θi)
where I is a finite set and for each i ∈ I, Θi is a finite set of (Q,k)-descriptions, such that:
- every member of Θi provably entails ϕ , and
- every member of Γ is provably entailed by some member of Θi.
For a proof of this lemma, see [3].
Now fix a finite set of propositional variables Q. Given a Q-formula ϕ let ϕ̂ denote the equivalence
class of the formula under provable equivalence. For a finite set of formulas Γ set
Γ̂ = {ϕ̂ | ϕ ∈ Γ}
We construct a neighborhood model M= (W,R,V ) as follows:
• W = {(ϕ̂ ,k) | ϕ is a (Q,k)-description and k < ω}
• For a player P let RP be the union of the sets
{((ϕ̂ ,k+1), Γ̂×{k}) ∈W ×P(W ) | ϕ ⊢ [P](Γ̂;
∨
Γ̂)}
and
{((ϕ̂ ,0),W ) | (ϕ̂ ,0) ∈W}
• Finally, for any propositional variable p, set V (p) = {ϕ̂ | ϕ ⊢ p} if p ∈Q, V (p) = /0 otherwise.
Note that this is well defined, i.e. whether (ϕ̂ , Γ̂) ∈ RP is independent of the choice of witnesses ϕ ,Γ of
the equivalence classes. The following lemma can be proved exactly as in [?], and we refer to that paper
for the details:
Lemma 2 (Truth lemma). Let M be constructed as above, and let ψ be any basic formula of modal
depth ≤ k whose propositional variables all belong to Q and such that all game terms appearing in ψ
belong to τ . Then for every (Q,τ ,k)-description ϕ , we have:
M,(ϕ̂ ,k)  ψ iff ϕ ⊢ ψ
The addition we need to make here is the following lemma:
Lemma 3. The structure M construced above is a game model, i.e. it satisfies the Non-emptiness,
Consistency and Instantiatedness constraints.
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Proof. First, note that all the conditions hold for the image of each relation on an element ofW of the
form (ϕ̂,0). So we can focus on the images of relations of the form RP on states of the form (ϕ̂ ,k+ 1)
for some k.
The Non-emptiness condition is proved straightforwardly using the axiom (Non-Em), we leave this
to the reader. For Instantiatedness, suppose that
((ϕ̂ ,k+1),Θ̂×{k}) ∈ RA
By definition, we get ϕ ⊢ [A](Θ;
∨
Θ). Pick an element (θ̂ ,k) ∈ Θ×{k}. By (Weak) and (Mon) we get
[A](Θ;
∨
Θ) ⊢ [A](θ ;⊤), so ϕ ⊢ [A](θ ;⊤). By the axiom (Inst) we get ϕ ⊢ [B](θ ;⊤) as well. Since ϕ
is a (Q,k+ 1)-description, we can derive from Lemma 1 that there is some set Ψ of (Q,k)-descriptions
such that ϕ ⊢ [B](Ψ;
∨
Ψ), and such that there exists some ψ ∈ Ψ with ψ ⊢ θ . But since ψ ,θ are
both (Q,k)-descriptions, clearly this means that θ̂ = ψ̂ , so (θ̂ ,k) = (ψ̂ ,k). But this means that we get
((ϕ̂ ,k+1),Ψ̂×{k})∈ RB and (θ̂ ,k)∈ Ψ̂×{k} as required. The converse direction is proved in the same
manner.
For the Consistency condition, suppose that ((ϕ̂ ,k+1),Θ̂×{k})∈RA and ((ϕ̂ ,k+1),Θ̂′×{k})∈RB.
It is straightforward to prove, using that Θ and Θ′ are both sets of (Q,k)-descriptions, that if Θ̂×{k}
does not intersect Θ̂′×{k} then in fact
∨
Θ′ →¬
∨
Θ. But we have ϕ ⊢ [A](Θ;
∨
Θ), hence ϕ ⊢ [A]
∨
Θ
by the axiom schema (Weak). Furthermore we have:
ϕ ⊢ [B](Θ′;
∨
Θ′) ⊢ [B]
∨
Θ′ ⊢ [B]¬
∨
Θ
But then ϕ ⊢ [A]
∨
Θ∧ [B]¬
∨
Θ, and it follows from the axiom schema (Cons) that ϕ cannot be consistent,
which contradicts our assumption that ϕ was a (Q,k+1)-description.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 2 with the easy observation that any consistent basic formula of depth≤ k,
variables in Q and atomic games among τ is provably entailed by some (Q,k)-description1 , we obtain
Theorem 6.
As a corollary to this proof, we get:
Theorem 7. The logic IGL is decidable and has the effective finite model property.
IGL is a high-level logic of basic powers in social interaction. The reader may find it of interest to
see what the above axioms say when read as statements about games.
6 Adding game operations
Our third contribution in this paper concerns the addition of structure to games, in the form of natural
game operations.
6.1 Game algebra of strong powers
In this section we use some basic concepts of universal algebra, see for example [5]. For simplicity, we
restrict attention to finite games, so that G({A,B},O) is now the set of finite games with outcomes in O.
Thus the outcome map of a game G can be viewed a map o from the leaves in G into O.
1This follows from Lindenbaum’s lemma together with the observation that there are at most finitely many formulas of depth
≤ k, variables in Q and game terms among τ up to provable equivalence, so we can take a conjunction of all representatives of
each equivalence class of such formulas belonging to a given maximal consistent set.
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Consider a set of games on a fixed set of outcomes O. We define operations in a standard manner,
with binary +,× corresponding to choice for A,B respectively, and a unary operation − for game dual
(‘role switch’). The game G1 + G2 (G1 × G2) is defined as follows: let G1 = (T1, t1,o1,Π1) and let
G2 = (T2, t2,o2,Π2). We first construct the tree T
′ by adding a new root r with two successors, and the
left successor is the root of a subtree isomorphic with T1 via a fixed isomorphism i1, the right successor
is the root of a subtree isomorphic with T2 via a fixed isomorphism i2. The turn function t
′ is defined by
setting t ′(r) = A (t ′(r) = B). For a node u in the subtree corresponding to the left successor of the root
r we set t ′(u) = t1(i1(u)) and similarly for a node u in the subtree corresponding to the right successor
of the root r we set t ′(u) = t2(i2(u)). The outcome map o
′ is defined by setting o′(l) = o1(i1(l)) for a
leaf in the subtree corresponding to the left successor of r, and o′(l) = o2(i2(l)) for a leaf in the subtree
corresponding to the right successor of r. We define a partition Π′ by setting
Π′ = {{r}}∪{i−11 [Z] | Z ∈ Π1}∪{i
−1
2 [Z] | Z ∈ Π2}.
The game G1+G2 (G1×G2) is then defined as (T
′, t ′,o′,Π′).
The construction of−Gi is much simpler, it merely changes the turn assignment by switching players
at each position, otherwise keeping everything the same.
Proposition 4. Strong power equivalence is a congruence on the algebra 〈G({A,B},O),+,×,−〉.
This motivates the following definition:
Definition 14. The strong algebra of games G (with outcomes O) is the quotient:
〈G({A,B},O),+,×,−〉/ ≃
The equational theory of the algebra G is of special interest here, as it can be viewed as a new weaker
propositional logic, where distributivity fails, witness our example in Figure 1. By contrast, for standard
power equivalence, this algebra is known to be a distributive de Morgan algebra.
But with strong power equivalence, much more basic principles than distributivity fail. For instance,
the operations × and and + are not idempotent, the following equations fail:
x× x= x x+ x= x
For the first failure, take a two-player game G in which A has the first move, and simply chooses between
two outcomes 0,1. Then {0,1} is a basic power of A in G ×G , but not in G .
Still, many laws known from game algebra do go through.
Proposition 5. The following equations hold in G:
Associativity x+(y+ z) = (x+ y)+ z,
x× (y× z) = (x× y)× z
Commutativity x+ y= y+ x, x× y= y× x
Double Negation −− x= x
De Morgan −(x+ y) =−x×−y, −(x× y) =−x+−y
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6.2 Dynamic game logic for basic powers
Our game algebra still misses one important operation, namely, sequential composition. For this oper-
ation to make sense, we need to take a dynamic view of games as state-transforming processes, in the
style of dynamic game logic (cf. [13], [9],[2]).
Definition 15. A dynamic two-player game over a set X (of “states”) is a map g : X → G({A,B},X),
assigning a game with outcome set X to each state in X . We denote the set of dynamic two-player games
over X by D({A,B},X).
The operations +,× and − are naturally lifted to dynamic games by defining them component-wise
in an obvious manner, and so are the relations ∼,≃ of power equivalence and strong power equivalence.
Now, given dynamic games g1,g2 : X →G({A,B},X), we can define the sequential composition g1 ◦g2
by letting g1 ◦g2(u) be constructed by replacing each leaf l in g1(u) by a copy of the game tree g2(o1(l)),
where o1 is the outcome map associated with g1(u).
In this way, we get an extended game algebra. For power equivalence, the complete algebra of the
propositional operations plus sequential composition has been axiomatized in [8, 15]. For basic powers
and strong equivalence in our new sense, however, this is an open problem.
However, we now run into some unexpected trouble:
Proposition 6. Let O= {x,y}. Then the relation of strong power equivalence over D({A,B},O) is not a
congruence with respect to sequential game composition.
To see why this is so, consider the two perfect information games displayed in Figure 2, which have
an obvious instantiantial neighborhood bisimulation between them. The games are not strongly power
equivalent, since player B has a basic power {x,y} in the game to the right, but not to the left. But both
games can clearly be obtained as the sequential composition of strongly power equivalent games:
x y
B
✼✼✼✼
✞✞✞✞
A
x y x y
B
✼✼✼✼
✞✞✞✞
B
✼✼✼✼
✞✞✞✞
A
❊❊❊❊❊❊
②②②②②②
Figure 2: A threat to compositionality: instantial bisimulation does not preserve basic powers.
This failure might seem a serious challenge to the compositional methodology of dynamic game
logic. But when we analyze what goes wrong in the example, the reason is the functional character of
strategies. They force a unique choice at each turn, making B too specific in the game on the left.
To remedy this situation, we suggest to widen the notion of a strategy to allow non-determinism,
so that strategies may constrain the moves of a player, but not determine them uniquely. This is not
altogether foreign in game theory: in fact, mixed strategies can be interpreted in a similar way, and the
same move has also been defended for the broader notion of a ‘plan’ in [2].
Definition 16. A relational strategy for player P in a game G = (T , t,o,Π) is a binary relation σ over
T such that:
• σ [u] 6= /0 whenever u ∈ t−1[P], and
• σ [u] = σ [v] if u,v are in the same partition cell in Π.
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The set Match(σ) of non-deterministic matches guided by a strategy σ is defined in the obvious way.
We say that P ⊆ O is a basic relational power of P if there is a relational strategy σ for P in G such
that P = {o(m) | m ∈Match(σ)}. The set of basic relational powers of P is denoted by RP(G ). We say
that G1,G2 are semi-strongly power equivalent if RP(G1) = RP(G2), for each P ∈ {A,B}. Finally, we write
G1 ≡ G2 when G1,G2 are semi-strongly power equivalent.
The relation of semi-strong power equivalence can be lifted to an equivalence relation between dy-
namic games in the same component-wise manner as before.
The move to relational strategies does not trivialize the new equivalence concept proposed in this
paper. The two games in our running example of Figure 1 are not semi-strongly power equivalent,
so this slightly coarser equivalence notion is still fine enough to make the distinction that we wanted.
Furthermore, we get the result we are after:
Proposition 7. The relation ≡ of semi-strong power equivalence over D({A,B},O) is a congruence with
respect to the operations +,×,− plus sequential game composition ◦.
Definition 17. The strong dynamic game algebra is the quotient 〈D({A,B},O),+,×,−,◦〉/ ≡.
In this game algebra, we get a number of interesting valid equations known from the game algebra
of power equivalence:
Proposition 8. The following equations hold inD:
Associativity x◦ (y◦ z) = (x◦ y)◦ z
Dualization −(x◦ y) = (−x)◦ (−y)
Left Distribution (x+ y)◦ z= (x◦ z)+ (y◦ z)
Note also that some equations that were not valid in the functional setting now become valid, such as
idempotence: x+x= x. In this way the algebra is closer to the algebra of games under power equivalence,
but does not collapse to it: the distribution law x× (y+ z) = (x× y)+ (x× z) still fails, for example.
Relational strategies improve our game algebra. At the same time, our earlier results go through with
suitable modifications. In particular, our representation theorem for basic powers is easily amended to
capture relational basic powers. Consider the following condition on pairs FA,FB ⊆P(O):
Union Closure For any non-empty family of relational basic powers M ⊆ FA (M ⊆ FB), we have that⋃
M ∈ FA (
⋃
M ∈ FB).
Theorem 8. Let FA,FB be two families of subsets of O. Then FA,FB satisfy Non-emptiness, Consistency,
Instantiatedness and Union Closure if, and only if there is a game G such that FA = RA(G ) and FB =
RB(G ).
Finally, our basic game logic can also be extended with game terms to capture this algebraic rea-
soning, in the style of dynamic game logic, [13], [2]. We will then have instantial modalities describing
basic powers of player i in game G:
[G, i](Ψ;ϕ)
This formalism can be interpreted on our instantial game models, when we provide these with world-
dependent basic power relations for all players. The crucial point here is that, with the earlier obstacle to
compositionally overcome, we can define the power relation for a product game G1 ◦G2 in the following
inductive manner.
72 A New Game Equivalence
(u,Z) ∈ RP
G1◦G2
iff Z =
⋃
F , for some family F ⊆ PW and some Y ⊆W with (u,Y ) ∈ RP
G1
and
(Y,F) ∈ R˜ P
G2
.
This is the basis for obvious recursion axioms for the game operations that lead to the following
result.
Theorem 9. The dynamic game logic of relational basic powers is completely axiomatizable.
This logic has interesting further properties that deviate from known systems, especially in its ax-
iomatization of game iteration, which we will treat in a separate publication.
7 Further directions
In this final section we briefly consider some directions for future reseach, in particular:
• Enriching the logic with epistemic modalities to reason about imperfect information.
• Incorporating preference into the framework of basic powers and instantial game logic.
• Placing instantial game logic and strong power equivalence in a wider view perspective on the
many possible game logics and notions of game equivalence.
7.1 Imperfect information
In this paper, we have worked with imperfect information games from the start. This raises some issues
of intuitive interpretation. Imperfect information in games can arise for quite different reasons: players’
limited powers of observation of moves, but also players’ uncertainty about the strategies of other players.
All this brings in what players know about the game, and a richer game logic reflecting this would have
to incorporate epistemic modalities. Moreover, imperfect information sits somewhat uneasily with our
game algebra, since information sets can cross between subgames, disrupting the obvious compositional
structure. We have side-stepped this issue in the definition for our game operations, but at the price of
dealing with only a special class of imperfect information games. Clearly, a lot remains to be clarified.
7.2 Preference
This paper has studied ‘game forms’ with abstract outcomes without any specified preference ordering.
A natural next step is to consider proper games in which the players have preference orders over the set
of outcomes. This is necessary to connect the game equivalences we have considered here with standard
game theoretic concepts such as Nash equilibrium or solution methods like the elimination of dominated
strategies.
Adding modalities for preference is a well-known device in game logics, so we could also do this.
But preference does raise questions for our perspective. For instance, the games in Figure 1 have different
Backward Induction solutions with preference 2< 1< 3 for B, 1< 3< 2 for A. We may have to redefine
our basic powers in the presence of preference, considering only preference-optimal sets for a player.
But solution methods like Backward Induction also incorporate one particular view of rationality: they
make an assumption about agents, rather than being part of the neutral mathematics of the game. Perhaps
we need to study game equivalences parametrized to particular types of player.
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7.3 A multitude of game logics
This paper does not claim that there is one best level for viewing games. Extensive form, standard powers,
or strategic form all have their virtues, and we have merely claimed that there is room for one more natural
new option. All these levels come with their own logical languages matching the invariance relation, [2]:
relational modal logic for extensive games, modal neighborhood logic for standard powers, instantial
neighborhood logic for our basic powers, and multi-modal logics accessing the different dimensions of
matrix games.
This raises a systematic question. How are all these different logics related, given natural transfor-
mations from one level of game structure to another? For instance, on finite games, the modal logic of
forcing powers can be translated into a µ-calculus on the underlying extensive games, and the same is
true of our instantial modalities for basic powers, using the observations in Section 6. But modalities
for strategic form games are not easily compared with our forcing modalities: moving across rows or
columns means considering alternative strategies for players, something that would require a serious
extension of our forcing language. In addition, matrix logics have surprising features that have no coun-
terpart in our forcing logics, such as the undecidability of the full system for three players, which reflect
the undecidability of the product logic S5×S5×S5 [11].
We believe that systematizing the total picture of game logics and their interrelations holds great
interest, but we must leave this for further investigation.
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